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This paper seeks to examine the impact Marketing Board operation 
has had on the level of cotton producer prices as well as the success 
of marketing policy in stabilising these prices« A model of the 
Ugandan cotton sector is presented ir: a relationship between a set of 
endogenous policy target variables (i0e« interseasonal and intraseasonal 
producer price variability) and a set of exogenous variables and 
parameters (i»e» producer prices, ginners8 allowance, export tax rates, 
etc,) some subset of which are potential instruments of policy.. Within 
these relationships, we analyse the interrelate dness of unit export 
revenue, ginners' allowance, ginners' prices as well as producer prices,. 
7/e come to the conclusion that in the price determination exercise 
performed by the Marketing Board, producer prices are a "residual" 
iteiu0 furthermore, we analyse and quantify the extent to which the Marketing 
Board has reduced the variability of producer prices» we conclude that 
prior to 1965, the level of prices set was frequently inoptimal and this 
-..uouraged intraseasonal fluctuations® However, we find that the Board 
has absorbed 15$> of the total interseasonal instability, but because of the 
residual nature of producer prices in the disposal of unit export revenue, 
the price variable could not have been a "policy instrument" in the 
models Therefore, prices could not have been positively adjusted so as 
to minimise their variabilityo 
Export tax rates do not seem to have been varied for the purpose of 
stabilising prices eitherc Considering that this tax is unjustifiable 
from the point of view of world demand elasticity for Uganda cotton as well 
as the fact that the tax is resource distortive, we are then left with only 
one justification for this tax: a second-best solution to the government's 
fiscal needsc Finally, we observe that the Board's administrative costs have 
expanded out of proportion with the Board's level of operation due to 
internal inefficiency and political pressure on the Board to expand 
its bureaucracy as employer of "last resort"a Nevertheless, we are led 
to conclude that a neutral tax such as a land tax with less "announcement 
effects" could be used to obtain xhe necessary fiscal revenue that might 
then be deployed to employ people in more productive occupations than 
marketing the cotton crop* 
INTRODUCTION 
There axe several dimensions to the problem of agricultural 
marketing^ but certainly the pricing question still attracts the greatest 
interest on the part of researchers in various parts of Africa^ 
The pricing issue is not only important because it directly relates 
to the income and welfare of farmers, but also because prices are 
major signals in channeling resources into alternative lines of 
production thereby influencing the long run structure of the economye 
In studying the design and implementation of policy in respect 
to the cotton sector of the Ugandan economy, no analysis would be 
complete without making reference to the existing form of institutional 
arrangement in the pricing and marketing of the crop© The set up 
is dominated by the existence of a statutory Marketing Board which 
functions as an export monopoly and price stabilisation boards^ " 
Among other things, this body, called the Cotton Exporters Group 
during the period 1941 to 1949 and the Lint Marketing Board since 1949, 
has been charged with the responsibility for stabilising prices to 
producers over a given planting and harvest season* and as much as 
possible from one season to another^ Simultaneously,, the Board is 
vested with authority to fix a minimum price to be paid to farmers 
for all grades of cotton0 This is done at the beginning of the crop 2 
marketing season^ It fixes the allowance payable to buying and 
processing agents s It determines when the crop season begins and when it 
ends i designates official markets at which agents may buy cotton; 
it prescribes conditions of sale, handling, and storage; and it 
determines the grades of all cotton deliveries0 It has power 
to advance "crop finance" to (some) marketing middlemen as well as 
power to determine the level of inventory in its storage facilities 
and the level of the "Price Assistance Pund"a 
It is important at this stage that we have working definitions 
of certain terms related to the design and execution of policy in 
order that we may be able to put the " duties" and "powers" of the 
Marketing Board into analytical perspective© Conceptually, we can 
describe the structure of the cotton industry in Uganda, by the following 
19 Por a classification of Marketing Boards, see 20o 
2« Prior to 1969? the Board fixed minimum producer prices at the 
beginning of the planting season, April/May, but announced "actual" 
prices at the beginning of the marketing season (November/December)« 
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structural equation; 
(l) ffeij x29 ° o ° a xn? a2» 0 ® am) = ® 
where x^, Xg, „ 0 e, x^ are n endogenous variables comprising such 
items as output of cotton, the variance of producer prices, etc0, 
a^, a2, o o o, are m exogenous and / or lagged variables or 
parameters comprising such items as export prices, export tax rates, 
ginners1 allowance, etc*, Following Jan Tinbergen (46) we shall 
define a "policy target variable" as some subset of x^, Xg, e « x n 
with which the policy is concerned0 In our analysis, such policy 
target variables are intraseasonal producer price variability 2nd 
interseasonal producer price stability® Furthermore, an "instrument 
of policy" will be defined as a parameter belonging to the set 
a^, 3.^) o o e, a^ which is controlled administratively by the Marketing 
Board® In this analysis, producer prices, ginners® and processors® 
allowances and government export tax rates, all of which may be under 
the control of the Board, could be instruments of policy* A "measure" 
will be defined as a change in an instrument of policy® Finally, 
we shall say that "policy" consists of a set of target variables or 
target preference functions and a set of measures aimed at the 
fulfillment of these targets0 
The purpose of this paper is to utilise time series data 
on domestic and world market prices as well as other data to study 
the process by which producer prices as well as middleman prices are 
determined and also to ascertain the extent to which marketing policy 
has been so designed and so executed as to minimise producer price 
variability in Uganda's cotton sector^  this being one of the principal 
targetso In presenting the data and its interpretive analysis, we 
shall basically be testing the null hypothesis that given the 
mechanism by which producer prices are determined;, these prices are 
"policy instruments" and they have therefore been so determined as 
to minimise their interseasonal as well as their intraseasonal 
variability0 Against this statement, we shall also be simultaneously 
testing a competing (alternative) hypothesis that given the same 
mechanism by which producer prices are set, these prices are not 
"policy instruments", and therefore they could not have been so 
determined by the marketing authorities as to consciously and positively 
minimise their variability,. 
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2ae. Lint Marketing Board and the government set the minimum 
producer prices for seed cotton, but they do not physically make 
payment to the growers-* The Board as a paying agent only pays the 
processing middlemen (ginners) for deliveries to the Board of lint and 
seedo The ginners in turn pay the farmers for the purchase of seed 
ectton0 The Lint Marketing Board, therefore, simultaneously deter-
mines price at two levels — the minimus price that ginners can 
pay farmers and the actual price that ginners can receive from the 
Board for lint and seedo The difference between actual price 
received by farmers and actual price received by ginners is the ginner® s 
approved processing and baling cost allowance plus a per unit profit 
margin determined mutually by the Board end ginnersc In this 
respect therefore, the entire price fixing mechanism can be called 
a per unit cost pricing exercisee 
At the beginning of a crop season, the Marketing Board 
forms some ex ante idea of average selling price and the marketable 
quantity of cotton lint and seed for tae seasons The ginning and 
baling allowance to the middlemen is determined in advance of the 
season by a formula described in the next section^  Then with due 
allowance for its own marketing costs and (supposedly) the level of 
the Price Assistance Fund, the Board decides what minimum price growers 
will be paid by ginners for seed cotton^  
SaTEHbalHATIOH OP PRICES PAID TO &I3IIERS 
-J.iowances 
A Lint Price Fixing Committee was set up in 1955 under 
section 7(l)a of the Lint Marketing Board Ordinance, 1949, to devise 
a formula for lint prices payable to ginners by the Marketing Board. 
Its problem in essence was to determine the cost structure of ginnersa 
It listed sixty=five standard items of expenditure for the ginning 
firms; These are mainly materials, labour, property rental and insurance^  
In calculating allowable total middleman's costs, each of these 
items is weighted by the average bale output per "working" ginnery 
The complete list of all items is given in the Appendixo 
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in each cotton district for the preceding crop season® Then, allowance; 
are made on the basis of the cost of these weighted itemsc 
As an illustration, call "G" one particular ginner in a 
specified cotton ginning zones Let his inputs be indexed i« By 
definition, 1=1, 2,000, 65c L e t 2 be "toe physical magnitude of the 
i~th inputo If the average bale output per working ginnery in the 
zone was "e" in the previous crop season and p is the price of the 
i-th input, then G"5s ginning and baling allowance would be? 
65 
e T 1 
-i JL D =5 p. X. 1=1 X X 
65e 
In fact, since She . ' of "e" is an average and therefore does 
not vary with individual ginners, the expression above represents the 
middleman's cost allowance given by the Lint Marketing Board in its 
pricing decision^ 
Prom year to year, some of the p^ is adjusted to allow 
for changes in the cost of materials or services ® Often because of 
interdependence bet een some of these items, adjustment in one 
of them necessitates adjustment in others® As an example, in 
1353, because the prices receivable by growers were increased over 
their 1356 level, ginners' allowances for insurance of cash in 
transit, anticipatory exchange and interest on seed cotton purchases 
had to be revised upwards® 
He :.nburseme:.vt of Giim^rs for Pay in/ Farmers the Statutory Minimum Pric>-
In the process of fixing ginners' prices the Board also 
considers reimbursing the ginners for the price they had to offer 
fsimer&o The farmers' price set by the Marketing Board is based 
on a seed cotton value while the reimbursement must "be based on a lint 
cotton valueo The Board's problem, therefore, it to interpret the seed 
cotton value into a lint cotton value® 
First, the Board has to have a measure of the lint outturn 
r^ti; for eac-'. variety of cotton and for each cotton district® I:;*it 
outturn ratio is defined as the weight of lint derived from one vttiit 
= 5 = 
weight of seed cotton; ( In Uganda, the lint outturn, ratio is on the 
average 1/3 0 If the minimum allowed producer price (for seed 
\ T) T) 
cotton; were Ir s then its lint equivalent would be P e In 
general| for a lint outturn ratio n(o«n<l), and a producer price Pp 
is the amount the ginners receive from the Lint Marketing Board to 
•allow for the ginae^®' payment to the farmers of the minimum producer 
price set by the Board. 
The Board; a Charge to. Sinners for Cotton Seed 
In the ginnery, lint and cotton seed are joint products and 
both have a value 6 The ginners get a price also for the seedj a 
bi-produet of the ginning process© The Lint Marketing Board therefore 
makes a nominal charge to ginners for this saleable seeds The charge 
is used to adjust downwards the final ginners® price for lint* 
This lint price adjustment factor is determined in the following ways 
suppose again n was the lint outturn ratio and m an allowable wastage 
factor satisfying the condition (>eia<&< \ , Then, 1- (m+n) shows 
how much seed is produced and offered i^ sale to the Lint Marketing 
Board per pound of seed cotton purchased by ginners from growers© 
Furthermore 1 _ shows the amount of seed cotton required 
1 - (mm"T 
to produce one pound of cotton seed.- Therefore, ( _ \n 
\ 1 - (m+r J 
shows the amount of cotton lint which will be produced from the seed 
cotton required to produce one pound of cotton seed0 Furthermore, 
if the Board makes a nominal charge to ginners for seed of 3 cents 
per pound, then the cotton seed factor by which the price of lint will 
be adjusted downwards is: 
^ 1 - (m+rij J n 
In the final analysis, therefore; if we denote the price oj 
ST lint received by ginners from the Marketing Board by P- , then, 
ST 
P° = A ' S 
\ p.. ~ 
''
 1 1 n 
x ~ 1 . , n 
65 e 
/ _ — t j
\ 1 - (m+n ) ' 
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Final Settlement Between Ginners And She Lint Marketing Board. 
At The End of The Crop Season 
At the end of a current season the lint outturn ratios 
are recalculated on the basis of figures of total cotton lint and 
cotton seed sold by ginners to the Lint Marketing Board during the 
season0 If these turn out to be higher than those of the previous 
season ( on which the current season's ginners1 price estimates were 
based), then ginners are required to refund to the Lint Marketing 
Board the difference between the recalculated "ex-ginnery" prices 
(for lint and seed.) and the actual "ex-ginnery" prices paid by the 
Boards Conversely, if the lint outturn ratio turns out to be lower than 
in the previous season, then the Board pays ginners the difference between 
the recalculated ginners® price and the provisional price paid during the 
seasono 
The Marketing Board's Purchase Price of Cotton Seed from Ginners 
There is no comparable systematic way in which prices of 
cotton seed paid to ginners by the Board are determined® Usually 
these prices are much below their market value and the Board makes its 
biggest profits from the trade in cotton seedo The Marketing Board 
maintains that cotton seed is just a bi-product of the ginning process 
and ginners have expended no resources to produce it0 Farmers, too , 
who in the final analysis are responsible for producing the seed, 
are rarely aware that in selling seed cotton, they are selling lint 
and seed as two products potentially marketable separately0 These 
factors have given the Lint Marketing Board a strong hand, and the 
Board has in the past appropriated for itself most of the value of 
cotton seed® The seriousness of this pricing error was not realised 
•until 1972, as is described below0 
Cotton seed is the raw material for the manufacture in 
Uganda of edible (cooking) oil0 During 1972, the oil mills in Uganda 
were unable to get enough cotton seed from the Marketing Board 
because deliveries to the Board of cotton seed by ginners almost 
came to a stop0 There developed a black market trade outside Uganda in 
Uganda's oil seed and even in the small quantity of edible oil still 
manufactured in the country from the minimal seed available® 
This consequence of the seed pricing problem was potential 
before 1972 but was never real because the ginners, 60% of whom were 
of Asian origin, were politically and economically cooperative with 




This vulnerability of producer prices to effects of policy measures 
aimed at other goals within the marketing model and the equal vulnerability 
to the marketing institution's inefficiency is borne out by the report 
of the 1966 Government Commission of Inquiry into the Cotton Industry® 
This Commission's report suggested to the government that producer prices 
should be decreased to make them "realistic" so that the Marketing 
Board will not continue to bear deficits,, (?,poll) This re-
commendation was made as if the level of producer prices explained the 
size of the Marketing Board's deficits® Such a recommendation was 
clearly based on an insufficient analysis of the structure of per 
unit prices, and demonstrates the inbuilt downward pressure on 
producer prices0 
OPTIIIALITY OF PRODUCER BBICE AIH) GIBUSES' EQUILIBRIUM 
Ginners try to maximise their total profits from any one 
crop season's operations® with the form of allowances described in the 
preceding section, they try to increase their profit per unit by 
purchasing the 65 "allowed" input items from the cheapest source 
and often at the expense of quality® Cases are documented in the 
marketing reports where complaints have been lodged against some ginners 
for using sub-standard gunny bags and outdated weighing spring 
balances which -understate the weight of seed cotton purchased from 
growers® {7?Pc20) Whenever possible, they also try to overstate the 
cost of these items, especially wages to African employees® With the 
level of unit profit determined, since it does not vary with the volume 
of sales, a ginner's total profits will depend on his level of 
turnover and efficiency of operation® 
The decision by the Board to interfere in the pricing 
mechanism at the ginning level primarily to protect the interests 
of farmers presupposes that market forces would be unable to settle 
a fair producer price® Such market failure could be a consequence of the 
behaviour of the ginners as if they were in a situation of 
oligopsony® In principal each ginner could be in a position of 
monopsony, especially because poor transportation limits the 
possibility of moving seed cotton over long distances® On the other 
hand, this situation could be due to collusion among ginners0 
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In order to analyse the evidence about the optimality or 
inoptimality of previous ginners' prices fixed by the Board in 
relation to those fixed for farmers, let us start with the following 
assumption; given the pricing system and the legal obligation by 
the Board to purchase all deliveries of lint cotton, a ginner's 
marginal revenue is not a function of the level of his sales to the 
Board* For the ginner, therefore, there is no trade-off between 
the level of sales and the marginal increment to total revenue from 
these sales® This is a condition comparable to the perfect competition 
case; an infinitely elastic demand curve for the ginner's output* 
On the input side, we shall portray conditions of potential 
monopsony and its associated equilibrium* Then we will show the 
possible equilibrium positions corresponding to the Board1s minimum 
producer price, the instrument by which the marketing arrangement 
imposes on the ginners perfect competition conditions in the market 
for seed cotton input* Within this framework, it is possible to 
explain past intraseasonal producer price fluctuations as a response 
to inoptimal producer prices which the ginners were required by 
the Board to pay to farmers® 
The possible perfectly competitive equilibria that the Marketing 
Board may impose on a ginner and his potential monopsony equilibrium 
are depicted in Figure 1® 
Figure 1: Equilibrium of a Ginner Under Monopsony and the Scope of 
Marketing Board Regulation 
IDS/DP/199 
Beginning with the ginner's potential monopsony position, in 
Figure 1 , HO is the marginal outlay curve ( or marginal expenditure), 
SS' the supply curve for seed cotton and IOTP is the ginner's marginal 
value product — the increment to total revenue due to the purchase 
of an additional unit of seed cotton® This quantity depends on the 
marginal product of seed cotton in the production of lint cotton since 
the ginner's price is fixed by the Board, thereby artificially 
creating a perfectly competitive demand curve for lint cotton® 
A profit maximising ginner would aim at purchasing OCL of I> J» 
seed cotton, pay farmers a price of 0P_ and make monopsony profits 
equal to the rectangle EIS- A„ 
In trying to change the market structures (determining the 
equilibrium of the ginner) towards perfectly competitive conditions, 
the Marketing Board should try to shift poiaat L on the supply 
p* curve to point B by trying to determine a farmers' price P % Such 
p* 
a price would make the effective supply curve P~ BS® 0 At this price, 
the farmers would not only be getting a higher price for their seed, 
cotton but also the volume of seed cotton ginned would increase 
from OQ^ to OQ^ which is socially desirable* 
The Stability of Intra-Seasonal Producer Prices 
The history of Marketing Board pricing in Ugandans cotton 
industry is a story of mixed success® With regard to the policy 
goal of stabilising intra-seasonal producer prices, success has 
occasionally in the past been impaired by the inability of the 
Board to set an optimal producer price at the beginning of the season « 
In the context of the model depicted in Figure 1, the only 
px-optimal producer price is OP « If the Board were to fix a pir 
price greater than OP 9 then the supply of seed cotton to ginners 
would be in excess of their demand0 It would necessitate a downward 
revision of the price® There has in the last eight years been a 
crisis in the ginning industry in the sense that ginners and 
Commissions of Inquiry have complained that the ginning industry cannot 
operate optimally because not only is the ginning margin too small, 
but also the Board fixes the producer price too high, such as in p* 
excess of OP in Figure la The merits of this contention will be 
discussed® 
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p* 
When the Board has set the farmers® price well below OP , the 
effect has been much more distinct and much more interesting from 
the point of view of industry adjustments In the context of the model 
in Figure 1, consider a farmers1 price set by the Marketing Board pi p* 
at OP OP a At a producer price so low, the ginning industry tends 
to be more competitivee Ginners would compete for deliveries of seed 
cotton by farmers * This would have the effect of pushing up producer 
prices from time to time within one crop season above the Board's 
stipulated minimums This phenomenon reduces the marginal profit by 
reducing the marginal value product (assuming diminishing returns) 
and increasing the marginal outlay* The difference between actual 
producer price and the minimum producer price set by the Board could 
then be looked at as a measure of the Board's error in assessing the 
optimal producer price in relation to the ginners' price® 
In Uganda from time to time the producer price for seed 
cotton has been bid up by ginners during a single crop period thus 
implying that lower than optimal producer prices had been fixed by 
the Lint Marketing Board; This was a common phenomenon during the 
period 1950 to 1960* 
Hecent ^v^lop^nts 
The process whereby a ginner bids up producer prices in an 
attempt to attract some share of seed cotton that would otherwise be 
purchased by other ginners may cease with collusion among ginners. 
Furthermore, the bidding capacity of ginners depends on their actual 
realisable profit margins The ability of the ginning organisation 
in Uganda to bid up producer prices has decreased and almost ceased 
in recent years„ Firstly, as the ginning industry becomes more and 
more controlled by the co-operatives, there is less competition (especially 
since 1965; as compared to the pre-1965 period when private entrepreneurs 
dominated the industry® Secondly, the co-operatives are reputed to 
exhibit less business acumen, and they do not get as favourable terms 
from the Board in fixing profit margin as the private entrepreneurs 
dido This leaves them with less profit potentially transferable 
to producers® Thirdly,because of various types of inefficiency, 
especially in personnel and financial management, co-operatives 
are high-cost organisations vis la their private entrepreneurial 
counterpartst This reduces their realisable marginal profit; Therefore, 
unlike the pre-1965 era, the recent period of co-operative domination 
of ginning has been characterised by a situation where actual producer 
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prices during the seasons are the same as the minimum producer prices 
set by the Board at the beginning of each season® 
• THE HISTORICAL STRUCTURE ,'JTD STA3IIITY Off IKTrRSEASOITAI; PER UNIT 
PRICES UEDER MtRKSTIITG BO.'-RD TRAPSIS 
Having discussed the factors relevant to the determination 
of producer prices and the mechanism by which the marketing system 
determines these prices, we can no* analyse the relative significance 
of these factors in the determination of past producer prices and the 
extent to which the Marketing Board has been able to behave in a way 
such as to stabilise producer prices vis- i-vis world market priceso 
In Table 2, the absolute magnitude of each of the six factors 
determining the level of producer prices is presented® Furthermore, 
the percentage of the total export price is shown for each factors 
It will be noticed in row 1 of the table that producer prices have at 
their highest been 23e$$> of the c0isf* export pricec The ginning and 
baling- allowances were a lower percentage of Csicfs export price than the 
producer prices were up to 1958, but remained higher from then up 
to 1965o Then the lint Marketing Board substantially reduced this 
allowance to make good its deficitsc Export tax as a percentage of 
export price was highest at'X0c7$> in 1951, and until 1953 was a 
bigger share of export price than producer pricee The relative 
percentages of the two remained about the same up to 1957, when 
export prices started falling; Thereafter, the percentage of export 
t&ses has been substantially lower* Until 1952, the share of 
Marketing Board net surplus (deficit} vvas more than twice as large as the 
share of producer price in the export price= Thereafter, its share was 
lower but positive up to 1958s It has since been negative and somewhat 
increasing in absolute value except for the year 19604 By far 
the biggest share of the export price is the item listed as "Administrative , 
Freight, Insurance, Marketing and Miscellaneous Expenditure"3 
Unfortunately, because of data deficiencies, it was not possible to break 
down this item completely into its component parts, but as can be 
seen, its share of the export price is unbelievably high® Almost 
each year it is more than twice the share of producer prices® 
It is worth noting that this figure also reveals an index of the 
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4 "underrealisation factor" <> But we can only at best make general 
statements based on a priori knowledge since the data is not 
sufficiently detailed for an empirical establishment of these 
possibilities® 
INTEBSEASONAL STABILITY OP PBODUCEBS' Bte8£&- T3 A- / 
Instability Index 
Traditionally, two alternative measures of instability have 
been used in this type of study, average annual percentage change 
and average annual percentage deviation from trend0 However, there 
are serious limitations to the use of annual percentage change as an 
index of instability in time series analysis0 
In the first place, if there exists differing trends from period 
to period, it is not possible to make meaningful comparisons among 
the instabilities of various periods; those with rising or falling 
trends will show an upward bias in this instability measure relative 
to those with no trend, the bias increasing with the steepness of the 
trende 
Secondly, where the intention of the stabilising operation 
is to smooth out short term fluctuations from longer term movements, 
year to year changes may not be as important as the distance each year 
from the long run patterno We therefore do not use this index in our 
analysisc 
Observation of data shows that straight line or exponential 
trends do not reflect accurately the relevant medium term movements 
of Uganda's cotton export prices and incomes in the postwar period 
which were to be smoothed<> Therefore, a five year moving average 
was employed insteado The average of deviation from the five year 
moving average, each expressed as a percentage of the centered five 
year moving average, therefore, has been calculated as the most 
appropriate measure of instability® 
PoToBauer defines "underrealisation" as the revenue per unit 
forgone by the Board's inability to realise the highest possible world 
market price which private exporters do seem to realise for comparable 
commoditieso See 27, p»340„ 
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Algebraic Definition of the Index 
Let X be the observed variable in each of the samples, 1 
the size of the sample and t a time subscript, 
Definition (i) : A,fc = Xt _ 2 + T.% _ 1 + + Xt + x + Zt + 2 
The latter definition is the relevant instability index^  
Stability of Producer Prices vis-a-vis World Market Prices 
Table 3 shows the data on producer prices for the period 
1945 to 1969 and the computed instability index* Table 4 shows the 
data on cotton export prices and the computed instability index® The 
total instability of Uganda's cotton export prices, as measured by-
average annual percentage deviation from a centered five year moving 
„' / yj s 
average trend, is 8C5> ( I = 3*5 in Table 4 ja Instability index of 
producer prices is 6»7 % ( I" = 6«7 in Table 3)« One must admit, 
thereforeg that total instability even of world export prices has bvstn 
relatively smalls Nevertheless, total instability has been decreased by 
roughly: 1 ( 8,5 - 6,7 ) = 15/"=. 
S.5 
EgBgCTS CP (M TS^ STABILITY CF PBO JU CEB PHICES 
We shall now try to see to what extent the pric<_ stabilising 
effect calculated in the last section is due to any positive policy 




a 19 » 
unit revenue and expenditure0 This is done in Figure 20 In this graph, 
we observe that the least stable items have been Marketing Board surplus 
and administrative insurance, freight? marketing and miscellaneous 
expenditurec By and large5 the rest of the items" shares of export 
price have been stable except ginning and baling allowance after 19640 
However, we cannot say that the instability of the Board's marketing surplus, 
the Board's administrative, marketing and miscellaneous expenditure and 
the recent instability of the ginners' allowance have been the factors 
shielding producer prices from export price instability?, Firstly, 
the reduction of the ginners® allowance has been a deliberate attempt 
by the Lint Marketing Board to make up for its marketing deficit 
rather than to stabilise prices0 This was a measure that the 1966 
Cotton Industry Heport deplored, since according to the Report 
producer prices rather than ginning allowance should have been adjusted 
downwards to moke them "more realistic"„(7>p«ll} is suggested 
tty Figure 2, the existence and persistence of deficits has been more 
due to the increase in the Board's operating coots than to n un-
realistic level of producer prices,. This deficit does not even seem to 
depend on the fluctuations in export price 0 IL. fc:t- since 1959 export 
price? sees, tc have „ vv.bili-.ci along a trend exhibiting a two-year 
cycle<. 3ia.ee it is also observable thai export duly relative to 
producer prices La* been sore or less stable& the bulk of the Board's 
trading deficits can only be explained by the increase in the Board's 
operating costs relative to export prices and relative to the level 
of cotton exports® In essence$ the Board should be made to operate, 
more efficiently in order to overcome its deficits* 
".That can we then identify as the policy measures in our 
marketing model: changes in export tax ratess changes in the rate 
of annual Marketing Board surplus, changes in the level of the Price 
Assistance Fund, changes in export revenue or changes in producer 
price itself? Before we :an determine whether these h.ve or have not 
constituted policy measuress we must first determine which of them are 
potential policy instruments as defined in the first section0 "!e shall 
start by determining the number of degrees of freedom to execute 
a policy measure in this model® 
If the marketing system can .independently adjust producer prices, 
local government bonus$ ginning and baling allowance, the rate of export 
duty, the level of the Price Assistance Fund and administrative, marketing 
and miscellaneous expenditure, then it cannot independently adjust 
Marketing Board surplus © This failure would be a "result of the 
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existence in the system of an exogenous factor, export income, which 
clearly the Board cannot controls Therefore, in general, we can say 
that the system potentially has six degrees of freedom® vie have already 
pointed out that producer price is a residual iteme It is, therefore, 
not independently controlled by the marketing authorities0 Therefore 
it is not a policy instrument and changes in producer price do not 
represent policy measures0 
The instability of the Board's surplus has also been a result of 
increases in the administrative, marketing and miscellaneous expenditure0 
Therefore, the Board has failed to control both administrative cost 
and deficit, so taat possibly one but not both can be classified as 
policy instruments® Since the Board claims to be eager to reduce its 
deficit but has not done so, it is clear that analytically the 
surplus/deficit item on the balance sheet is not a policy instrument 
as defined in the first section. This leaves the possibility open that 
administrative expenditure may be an instrument of policy® 
Government bonuses, ginning and baling allowance and the 
level of the Price Assistance Fund can all be administratively controlled 
independently and they are therefore potential policy instrumentso 
Having identified potential policy instruments, we are now 
in a position to say what policy measures have actually been invoked,, 
The data in Table 2 and its graphical form,Figure 2, show that there 
has not been any significant instability (change) in local government 
bonus and the rate of export dutye However, there have been changes 
in baling and ginning allowances; the level of the Price Assistance Fund 
was constantly changed and the fund was eventually abolishedo The 
level of administrative, ; marketing and miscellaneous expenditure 
has fluctuated too© These are all the changes which could indicate 
possible policy measures taken by the cotton marketing authoritiese 
The baling and ginning allowance measures were designed to ease the 
Marketing Board deficit, the Price Assistance Fund measures were to 
subsidise the Government's fiscal programs, and the administrative, 
marketing and miscellaneous expenditure measures were to finance an 
expanding marketing bureaucracys None of these measures had the 
effect of subsidising producer price® 
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The inescapable conclusion is that the sduc'"—tsJlss'l -about 
p:*oducer price subsidy associated with Lint Marketing Eosrd trading 
and vsry wel* publicised by the Board in its annual reports is in 
fact a subsidy to the Board to cover its soaring operating costs, 
which have not been matched by increases in the volume of cotton 
traded or the amount of revenue earned by the Board 3 
One then asks the question: What factor has brought about 
the 15% reduction in instability? A plausible answer may be that 
prices were fixed so low in the early stages that this level could 
h.-.ve been maintained irrespective of any price-related policj 
measures within the marketing model® 
orxc i">!i"*r 
The miniriisation of interseasonal and intraserasonal 
variability of producer prices has been one of the principal targets 
in the design and implementation of marketing policy in Uganda's 
cotton industrys It has been shown in our analysis that H-thoxigh 
world market price fluctuation about a five-year centered moving 
average was 3-5the comparable fluctuation of domestic producer prices 
wa*s only 6.7 Thus the Board has exercised a price stabilising 
effect e-pual to 15/o of the total magnitude of instability4 While 
t.c- auet observe -that the total instability ev*n of world export psdou 
has relatively sm^ll, we must nevertheless accept that the 
Buarc! achieved some producer price stability in the face of fluctuating 
market prices® However, given the residual status of producer 
px-ices in the disposal of unit export earnings by the Board, we cannot 
accept that the stability of these prices vis-a-vis export priess has 
be >n a result of any systematic policy measures® We therefore reject 
the ijii 11 hypothesis that because the Board determines producer prices, 
it has, therefore> adjusted then as a policy measure to achieve their 
stability® V-e accept the alternative hype thesis that given the 
oachanisa by which the marketing arrangement determines producer 
prices.^  prices are not a policy instrument and therefore the relative 
stability of these prices vis-?-vis world market prices is purely 
coincidental® 
The analysis has also shown that the marketing structure 
is operating inefficiently- The system as portrayed has potentially 
six degrees of freedom or different ways in which the Board could 
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execute a policy measures However, under the present organisation, 
the Board has failed to control its deficits (surplus) not because 
it cannot control export revenue (which it cannot control anyway), 
but because it. cannot control administrative, marketing and miscellaneous 
expenditureo Thus the deficit is not a result of any factors exogenous 
to the system but is a result of internal structural defects© When 
we also recall that the nature of the mechanism by which producer 
prices are determined does not make producer prices a policy instrument, 
then the lint Marketing system as presently constituted haa only 
four degrees of freedom^ , two less than could be attained© Thus we 
have unusual situation in which the Board's surplus(deficit) which 
should be expected to depend on the uncontrollable variations in 
export revenue (with the Board or government controlling all other 
items) actually originates from the endogenous variables in the 
system. In making this point, however, we cannot forget the political 
pressures upon the Marketing 3oard to expand its bureaucracy as an 
employer of last resort- Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the 
fact that given the fairly price elastic world market demand for 
Uganda cotton, there could be no justification for an export tax other 
than on the basis of a necessary second-best solution to the government's 
fiscal needs = IJ. would be more efficient for the country to pay 
producers a higher price using a more neutral, less resource distortive 
tax such as a land tax or income tax to obtain government revenues 
which could then be used to employ individuals for more productive 
purposes than marketing the cotton crop© From the point of view of 
the welfare of farmers, the marketing inefficiency described above is 
an additional burden© Since producer price is a residual item, it is 
depressed in absolute terms not only by the tax levy and other items 
sometimes not even specified, but also by the sizeable inefficiency-
related administrative costs© 
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:HS 113 ~ 0~ G-IETZ55' HJPtJT IThM5 -XLC-TID TJRLDEP; TIE LIITT HASEE'TINS BG.HID'0 
SYSTEM EG ISTEH-IISINRG GIMERS' ALLOWANCES 
At the beginning of the crop season, a range of input items in th< 
ginning process is determined ex ante by a Lint Price Fixing Commit tee0 
This committee is appointed by the government and is a liason between 
the ginning industry and the price fixing authority. Its role, however, 
is basically advisory0 
The full list of input items which the Lint Marketing Board 
takes into account in determining ginners5 cost allowance as the 
basis for fixing ginners' price includes enterprise licence, manager's 
(buyer's) salary, cashier's salary, African wages for buying 
(ordinary porters), medical charges, travelling expenses from head 
office to ginnery, steelyards and spring balances used at ginnery, 
issue of hessian squares to producers, specie commission and transport, 
insurance of seed cotton at ginnery, insurance of cash in transit, 
market stores licenses, ground rent and/or store rentals, store repairs, 
store buyer's commission, twine for bagging, depreciation of gunny 
bags, insurance of seed cotton at market stores^  inspection 
market stores and store cotton, steelyards or spring balances used 
at market stores, ginning and baling license, ginnery and labour 
camp ground rent, repairs to buildings, insurance on buildings, 
insurance on plant, machinery and ginnery stocks, clerk's salary, 
engineer's salary, fitter's salary, wages at ginnery, general 
expenses at ginnery, specie commission on wages and salaries, 
depreciation and repairs to labour camp, rations for labour, workmen's 
compensation insurance, fuel and power, oils and greases, machinery 
and gin spares, Hessian, baling hoops, baling studs, twine , stencil 
ink and brushes, loading of lint at stations, sampling ^  head 
office manager, accountant's salary, head office wages, head office rent, 
head office expenses, postage, telegrams, telephone, etc., fidelity 
insurance, pool expenses, anticipatory exchange, interest on seed 
cotton purchases, head office management, Kyalo transport, bachaluzi 
commission store to ginnery transport of seed cotton, depreciation on 
buildings, plant and machinery, buying profit, ginning profit, gunny 
bags for bagging cotton seed, sewing and marking of cotton seed, 
booking and loading charges for cotton seed, storage and insurance 
of cotton seed, handling allowance for cotton seed and charge to 
ginners for cotton seed* IDS/DP/199 
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